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Abstract 
 
One often assumes that we, human beings are rational and first think and than act. This paper is 
an attempt to describe the mental characteristics governing the performance of regular everyday 
actions; and shows that no mental act has to precede our actions, instead of consciously thinking 
before we act, we mostly act while simultaneously overseeing our acting. The case of ball juggling 
is used to underpin the analysis with empirical facts.
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1   Introduction 
In this paper I make an attempt to describe the mental stance applied by a 
human being while performing the standard routines of everyday life. The drive 
behind this attempt stems from research into what is called Machine 
Consciousness studies. Machine Consciousness studies cover efforts to construct 
machines that display characteristics which one might call mental. 
 
The notions of mind, the mental and consciousness have been studied 
extensively in Philosophy. For the purpose of sketching the position of my 
research a brief discussion of some of the central notions. Concerning the duality 
of body and mind the dominant presupposition of western thinking is that body 
and mind are distinct and that the mental realm is distinct and separate from the 
material world in which the body acts. Descartes’ famous ‘I think therefore I 
am’, is often taken as to imply a notion of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness 
is often thought to be manifested as rationality: to be able to reason about 
oneself. Moreover, rationality is usually associated with the verbal, resulting in 
associating mental processes with a language of thought. The presupposition that 
mental processes proceed as a language of thought tempted some philosophers to 
define consciousness as a ‘Centre of Narrative Gravity’, (Dennett 2002).  
In line with such reasoning is the often-encountered assumption – which I 
believe is generally untrue –  that a certain mental act precedes our bodily 
actions, or in plain language that we first think and then act. For instance 
Haggard et al. (2002) write: “Normal human experience consists of a coherent 
stream of sensorimotor events, in which we formulate intentions to act and then 
move our bodies to produce a desired effect”.  
Indeed, on occasions we do first think and then try to act accordingly. Being 
human, we like to think of ourselves as rational beings. In the history of 
Philosophy Immanuel Kant is probably the clearest exponent of this view. He 
saw a human being as a logical subject of thought (Stuart, 2005) that is bound to 
act in the physical world. Kant’s work could be seen as a major attempt to give 
primacy to rationality. However, Kant did not assume that we are rational; he 
argued that we should be rational; in his view rationality had to be fought for.  
Concerning mental processes and body control, William James (1890) clearly 
noted that the suggested ordering in time in which a mental act precedes our 
bodily actions, does not hold. He described his concept of ideomotor action 
summarised as: we think the act and it is done. An example of his: “We think to 
drink our coffee and we find ourselves already holding the cup in our hands”. I 
will argue a step beyond and show that we often act before any conscious 
thinking can occur. My point is not to substantiate a general moral excuse for 
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cases where we have done things, which we afterwards regret. My point is 
pragmatic: we cannot act and behave as we do in ordinary life if we first have to 
think (let alone think over) every action.  
Whereas philosophy of mind generally analyses and then tries to explain the 
working of the mind, machine consciousness studies aim at a constructive 
approach. Machine consciousness studies are considered a branch of robotics or 
Artificial Intelligence. Chrisley et al., (2005) describe the aim of these studies as: 
1) to create artifacts that have mental characteristics typically associated with 
consciousness (such as awareness, self-awareness, emotion and affect, 
experience, phenomenal states, imagination etc.) and 2) to model these aspects of 
natural systems in embodied models (e.g., robots).  
This definition stipulates that the mental phenomena are to be studied in an 
embodied creature; thus the combination of computing machinery for 
information processing and mechanical actuators generating physical action is 
brought into the focus. My aim is neither to discuss whether the aims of machine 
consciousness studies can ever be achieved using the means currently applied in 
machines and robots; nor whether are the aims of Artificial Intelligence and 
robotics achievable. My interest is in whether these constructive approaches 
produce new insights. Present-day computers provide robots with tremendous 
reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, the currently applied robots are far from 
being able to perform actions which seem elementary to a human being, such as 
throwing and catching a ball. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence move into an 
area, which is so familiar to us that we assume it all to be obvious. The lesson to 
be learned is that we hardly understand how we ourselves perform our actions, 
and in particular how sensory inputs guide our actions. 
   
The present paper is an attempt to identify the mental processes, which 
manifest themselves in regular action oriented contexts. Without being able to 
provide a systematic view, I will discuss a few assumptions which indicate and 
position the relevant mental processes. Reasoning appears not to provide the 
solution for building artificial creatures and I will show that rationality is not the 
major guide for our everyday acting; obviously, the latter does not imply that 
irrationality applies. Rationality requires reasoning and reasoning is a conscious 
process; below I show that conscious processes cannot control our everyday 
actions. 
In this paper I will hardly touch upon the notion of consciousness. Instead, 
the line of reasoning is the following. Any action and generally any perceptual 
input is accessible to consciousness only if it has passed through or has been 
passed on by attention. The processing by attention takes time and causes delay, 
and if the control of all actions has to pass attention then certain performances 
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cannot be executed by a human being. Nevertheless humans do perform these. 
Thus, the control of our acting does not necessarily pass attention, which means 
that certain activities and performances are beyond the control of consciousness. 
Instead of first thinking and then acting, we often only oversee our actions with 
our conscious and rational minds. Below, I will use juggling as the primary 
example to investigate the flow of the mental processes and prove my point.  
 
2   Attentional focus and Acting 
In the morning of a regular day, while deliberating on how to make the best 
out of the day ahead, we routinely drink our coffee and make our way to work, 
say by car. While driving the car, we suddenly stand on the brakes as we are 
forced to an emergency stop. Only after having come to a standstill it becomes 
clear what has happened the seconds before and what has been our contribution 
to the event.  
My interest is in the mental stance governing the behaviour before the 
emergency stop, and which I believe we usually take when routinely drinking 
coffee or driving the car. This is a stance under which actions are selected and 
performed (for instance grabbing the coffee cup or pushing the brakes) without 
the actions being in the focus of attention.  
 
In order to explore the stance, first a few words about the notion of attention. 
Our mind can be in different modes of activity, with sleeping as the extreme on 
the less active end. When awakening from sleep, our mind has to "warm-up" in 
an arousal phase. Then we become generally aware enough so that we can 
attend: the mind is aroused and proceeds via getting aware to attention. Further 
onwards, when there is attention, conscious experiencing, and consciousness and 
reasoning may come in.  
Our senses produce an overload of signals as they are continuously subject to 
various stimuli. Broadbent (1958) argued that the processing of semantic features 
(´features related to the meanings of objects´) from the senses’ inputs has severe 
capacity limitations. And since Broadbent’s work the faculty of attention is often 
conceived of as a filter for or a gate to consciousness, which blocks, weakens or 
inhibits incoming messages from the senses. Baars (1997) introduced the 
metaphor of attention acting as a spotlight in a theatre. When in the spotlight of 
attention, the mental processing becomes accessible to consciousness. The filter 
metaphor characterises the operations of attention as reductive while the 
spotlight metaphor suggests amplification; both nevertheless agree that attention 
is the gateway to consciousness and that it is selective. 
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A different but equally important aspect of attention is that it also has to do 
with action. “Awareness [or being aware] implies perception, a purely sensate 
phase of receptivity. Attention reaches. It is awareness stretched toward 
something. It has executive, motoric implications. We attend to things.” (Austin, 
1998).  
Attention can guide our actions; however, the question is whether all our 
actions are guided and controlled by attention. Appropriate applications of motor 
skills - that is to act appropriately - requires a proper combination of perception, 
action selection and action execution. The role of attention in relation to 
perception has been widely studied; however its role in applying motor-skills has 
not received as much scientific interest. The reason for this might be that motor-
control, which is a prerequisite for motor-skilfulness, is very much on and below 
the edge of what we can consciously experience and control. 
The performing arts and sports sciences deal with action and attention. Artists 
and sports men and women engage in what is called deliberate practice 
(Rossano, 2003) (Ericsson et al., 1993): the concentrated effort to hone and 
improve specific (mental and) physical skills. Literature on deliberate practice 
distinguishes between external attentional focus and internal attentional focus; 
internal attentional focus means that the performer directs attention to the 
movements itself, while in external attentional focus, the attention goes to the 
effects the movements have on the environment (Wulf and Prinz, 2001). 
Obviously, in both attitudes attention plays a prominent role.  
The influence of internal attentional focus may be observed in, for instance, 
dancing or martial arts classes. In a class of beginners, the students might be 
quite able to follow and copy the movements of their instructors. However, when 
the instructor explains the consecutive moves to the very detail, several students 
appear not to be able to perform, even though they may have performed quite 
well before. The reverse also applies: when the instructor is asked about the 
details of a move which (s)he has never made explicit before, it is likely he or 
she has to perform the movement first before being able to explain. Applying 
internal attentional and conscious focus to motor-control hampers the 
performance. Extreme examples are observed with patients suffering from the 
syndrome called apraxia. Apraxia denotes the inability of a patient to perform a 
certain skilled movement. For instance when asked to demonstrate teeth 
brushing, the patient is unable to do so, whereas he or she is perfectly able to 
brush the teeth in the morning, when there is no particular emphasis on the act 
itself.  
Attention obviously has motoric implications. Generally internal attentional 
focus slows down movements and external attentional focus is more proficient 
Chapter Title 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Wulf and Prinz, 2001). The examples show that internal attentional focus and 
conscious control of motor-skills may even lead to an inability to act. 
The notion of external attentional focus is not clearly defined and allows 
several interpretations. In a narrow, but easy to define sense it denotes attention 
focusing on bringing about a single effect: directing a tennis ball, or throwing a 
single ball or bean bag into the air such that it can be caught. I will test this 
reading in the context of juggling. 
 
When performed well, juggling is great to watch. The magic about it is that 
the general spectator perceives the pattern that is formed by the balls (or other 
objects), but neglects the movements of the juggler. For instance, in the three-
ball pattern called yoyo (Dancey, 1994) the juggler only throws two balls while 
the third ball is kept in one hand and is carried throughout the pattern, but that 
does not in the least bothers the spectator. Only when the spectator is observing 
the scene as a whole but is neither focussing on a particular ball nor on the 
moves of the juggler the typical yoyo effect –of the balls appearing to be 
connected- is perceived. However, if one focuses on the one ball that the juggler 
keeps in the hand, the yoyo effect disappears. 
In the literature on sports psychology it is often assumed that external 
attentional focus is the only alternative to internal attentional focus; refer for 
instance to (Wulf and Prinz, 2001). The stance of the spectator shows that a third 
stance, one without focus, is possible as well. In the next section I will first 
investigate whether external attentional focus applies for a juggler; as the answer 
will be negative, I will also explore whether a stance similar to that of the 
spectator might apply.  
 
3   Acting and Attention Shifts 
The basic pattern in five-ball juggling is the cascade; and although basic, it is 
quite a step beyond three-ball juggling (Dancey, 1994). It is hard to learn and 
requires fast acting, the complication being that between throwing and catching 
the same ball four other objects – three of which are already up in the air - have 
to be handled. When first starting, it is a problem to throw each of the five balls 
one after the other before the first has returned (‘flashing’ as it is called), in 
doing so a novice will not be able to tell which ball was first thrown, let alone be 
able to catch it with the proper hand. The novice juggler is trying to apply full 
and focussed attention, and that leads him or her astray.  
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Juggling requires fast series of combinations of perception, action adaptation 
and action. The handling of a single ball is cyclic. To estimate the time of a 
cycle, assume a throwing height of one meter, which is more then most patterns, 
including the five-ball cascade require. The law of gravity leaves less than a 
second of time between throwing and catching the same ball. In the interval of 
less than a second that this one ball is going up and down, four other objects  
have to be dealt with. They are flying around and have to be observed in order to 
be handled; figure 1 gives an overview of the five-ball cascade. 
  
 
Figure 1, the main actions in a five-ball cascade. 
 
Observations of jugglers show that the time lapse between two catches of the 
same hand may be as little as 0.2 seconds (refer to Polster (2003) for more 
details), this is indicated in figure 1 for consecutively catching balls (1) and (3). 
In this short interval several actions of this hand merge into each other: catching, 
bringing to throwing position (dwelling), throwing and preparing/waiting for the 
next. Since the juggling pattern is regular: in the middle of this series the other 
hand has to start its own series as well. In figure 1 ball (1) was the last to be 
caught and ball (2) is the next coming down and is to be caught about 0.1 second 
after ball (1) was caught. Obviously, the exact time between throwing ball (1) 
and catching ball (2) is less then 0.1 second; unfortunately I have no exact data. 
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In order for attention to be in control of the juggling actions, attention has to 
shift from ball to ball. Broadbent (1958) concluded that per second no more then 
two attention shifts can occur. Currently, psychologists distinguish between 
voluntary or internally (endogenously) driven attention shifts and involuntary or 
externally driven shifts; Broadbent only considered voluntary attention shifts 
(Lachter et al. 2004). Nevertheless, if attention is in control, the shifts have to be 
voluntarily. Recent work has found variations for voluntary attention shifts from 
0.5 second to 0.15 seconds (Lachter et al. 2004). Obviously, even a fast 
voluntary attention shift of 0.15 second is too slow to switch from ball (1) to ball 
(2) since the latter is due within 0.1 second. Voluntary shifts would suffice to 
handle the balls due for one hand, but are too slow to interweave the actions of 
the second hand.  
The previous section showed that internal attentional focus hampers 
execution of actions, and that the resulting actions are generally slower than 
when external attentional focus is applied. The case of five-ball juggling shows 
that external attentional focus, in the sense of attention focusing on bringing 
about a single effect fails as voluntary attention shifts require more time then the 
pattern allows.  
 
 
4 Attention Reduced 
Five-ball juggling cannot be governed by focused attention and voluntary 
attention shifts. Alternatively, involuntary attention shifts turn out to be much 
faster. Involuntary shifts require only 0.05 second (Lachter et al. 2004), which is 
in the order of three to ten times faster. The research into attention shifts is 
mainly based on experiments in which subjects are exposed to visual or audio 
inputs and are asked about what they perceive. However, juggling consists of an 
intricate combination of perception with actions such as movements of the limbs. 
Concerning acting, one also distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary 
acts. Similarly to the differences for attention shifts, voluntary acts are also slow 
compared to involuntary acts. The time required for the single voluntary act of 
pressing a button only when a light flashes is about 0.15 seconds (Austin, 1998). 
Voluntary acts are too slow to meet the constraints of juggling, thus, juggling is 
neither a series of voluntary actions. Involuntary acts, for example a reflexive 
jerk to shield the eyes from a flashing light, take only 0.025-0.05 seconds 
(Austin, 1998). Note that the times required for attention shifts are in the same 
order of magnitude as the times required for acting. The latter suggests that on 
occasions the body is as fast or maybe even faster than the mind. 
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Juggling is of course not a series of reflective jerks; the point is that humans 
can execute perception–action cycles at high speed. A recent assumption in 
cognitive neuroscience is that the mind has a layered structure with different 
organising levels concerning body experience. Neuroscience has found that there 
exist several distinct neural systems or circuitries for the perceptual control of 
movement (Rossano, 2003) and (Waszak et al., 2005). Raichle (1997) makes a 
distinction between “the neural circuitry underlying the unpractised, presumably 
conscious performance of a task on the one hand, and the practised presumably 
nonconscious performance of a task on the other hand.” The response time of the 
latter circuitry is significantly shorter than that of the first (Raichle, 1997). More 
recently, Waszak et al. (2005) distinguish between actions carried out in 
response to exogenous stimuli or stimulus-based actions, and actions selected 
endogenously or intention-based actions. They note that intention-based actions 
are typically goal-directed, but slower than stimulus based actions. 
In order to meet the time constraints, a five-ball juggler must apply a mental 
stance differing from internal or external attentional focus. This stance avoids 
intention-based actions, allowing the neural circuitry for stimulus-based actions 
to perform. Nevertheless, the stance must be very sensate and requires 
awareness; lacking an appropriate name, I call this stance: non-focussed 
awareness. And indeed, the experienced juggler does not focus on the individual 
balls. In his juggling book Dancey (1994) advises: “While learning [a five-ball 
pattern] you are trying to make yourself do it, when you can do it you watch 
yourself doing it.”  When acting, the juggler seems to be in a stance, which to a 
certain extend resembles that of a spectator. 
As said before, to learn to juggle five-balls is hard; the above observations 
help to explain this fact. The time constraints are too tight to apply conscious 
controlled or voluntary actions, nevertheless it is the slower intention-based 
circuit that is applied to learn or correct a move.  
 
I have shown that there simply is insufficient time for attention to interfere in 
five-ball juggling and that restricting attention results in faster actions. The 
surprising thing is that when no full attention is required for acting, the mind 
performs other tasks concurrently. 
Three-ball juggling is less demanding than five-ball juggling. While juggling, 
the juggler can do other things as well, for instance speak, walk etc.; however 
non-focussed awareness is permanently required, when the juggler’s attention 
drifts away and focuses elsewhere the balls drop. Car driving implies a similar 
requirement; the driver can perform many other things while driving but a certain 
level of awareness is required throughout. In daily life we perform many actions 
without attentional focus, car driving and juggling are two of the many possible 
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examples, cycling and walking are others. For instance, when walking the body 
performs an intricate combination of muscle activities to maintain posture.  
 
I have avoided any attempt to define the notion of attention; therefore I 
cannot conclude that attention is not involved in the stance of non-focussed 
awareness. But referring to the spotlight metaphor, if there is attention involved, 
it is only a dim light. Because attention is a preliminary for consciousness this 
conclusion has implications for consciousness as well. 
Concerning the relationship between consciousness and the body, the 
notion of body image plays a central role. In Yamadori’s three-layer model of the 
mind the body image emerges at the highest level. “The lowest level is an 
assembly of neuronal information coming from all parts of the body; at the 
middle level the body schema are situated which secure the emergence of the 
conscious body image at the third level” (Yamadori, 1997). The body schemata 
are subsystems ‘implementing’ James’ ideomotor actions, for instance grabbing 
the coffee cup. The suggestion is that the body image generates at the middle 
level and may pass on to the conscious level, thus leaving no active role for 
consciousness. The second level is rather independent from the conscious third 
level, which is confirmed by the split-brain studies and in particular very 
compellingly by the so-called Anarchic hand (Blakemore et al., 2002). The latter 
designates pathological behaviour in which a patient’s right hand manipulates a 
tool properly but ‘spontaneously’, that is without the patient neither consciously 
initiating the movement nor being able to inhibit the action. The anarchic hand 
shows that neither attention nor consciousness is a prerequisite or a necessary 
condition (sine qua non) for action; neither if them is necessarily the initiator of 
actions. Moreover, it even shows that there exist pathological cases where 
consciousness is unable to inhibit actions.  
Most people readily acknowledge that the internal functioning of our body is 
beyond our conscious control. The anarchic hand shows that even skilful 
behaviour might be beyond the span of control of consciousness. 
 
Conclusions 
Using the case of five-ball juggling I have made an attempt to analyse the 
mental stance taken by a human being when performing. I have called this a 
stance of non-focussed awareness. Unravelling this stance is interesting on its 
own, but it also sheds some light on the complex of mental states and stances by 
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which a human being monitors and controls his or her body and actions. 
Definitely the human body on its own is a complex system with a complex 
control structure, the understanding of which could function as a paradigm for 
robot and machine design. 
The case of five-ball juggling showed that the often-supposed sequence that a 
mental act precedes bodily actions - or that we first think and then act - cannot 
hold. Juggling is not a series of voluntary actions governed consciously. 
The conscious processing capacity is limited; attention is a gate to or filter for 
consciousness. Acting requires perception, action selection and action execution. 
Shifting the focus of attention is a relatively slow process. Five-ball juggling 
would be impossible if focused attention has to be applied. In general, attention 
may interfere with acting but that often results in poorer or slower execution. 
Restricting attention results in faster actions. The mental stance of the juggler is a 
very sensate stance in which there is typically little or no attentional focus. The 
latter implies that the performance cannot be subject to conscious control. 
Besides juggling, many actions are as well initiated and performed without 
attentional focus; they are mostly on and below the edge of conscious experience 
and control. In everyday practice we usually act before consciously thinking of 
it. The occasions where thinking precedes acting are the exception and not 
routine practice. Consciousness not necessarily initiates actions, moreover in 
certain cases conscious control cannot inhibit actions. Consciousness only has 
weak control over the acting body, even though subjects have the feeling they 
consciously control their body. Nevertheless, we do oversee our actions with our 
conscious and rational minds and except for pathological cases we are able to 
suppress many ‘spontaneous’ actions. 
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